Scott L. Mingus Sr. and Eric J. Wittenberg, the authors of more than forty Civil War books, have once again teamed up to present a history of the opening moves of the Gettysburg Campaign in the two-volume study "If We Are Striking for Pennsylvania": The Army of Northern Virginia's and Army of the Potomac's March to Gettysburg. This compelling study is one of the first to integrate the military, media, political, social, economic, and civilian perspectives with rank-and-file accounts from the soldiers of both armies as they inexorably march toward their destiny at Gettysburg. This first installment covers June 3-22, 1863, while the second, spanning June 22-30, completes the march and carries the armies to the eve of the fighting. Gen. Robert E. Lee began moving his victorious Army of Northern Virginia from the Old Dominion into Pennsylvania on June 3, 1863. Lee believed his army needed to win a major victory on Northern soil if the South was to have a chance to win the war. Transferring the fighting out of war-torn Virginia would allow the state time to heal while he supplied his army from untapped farms and stores in Maryland and the Keystone State. Lee had also convinced Pres. Jefferson Davis that his offensive would interfere with the Union effort to take Vicksburg in Mississippi. The bold movement would trigger extensive cavalry fighting and a major battle at Winchester before culminating in the bloody three-day battle at Gettysburg. As the Virginia army moved north, the Army of the Potomac responded by protecting the vital roads to Washington, D.C., in case Lee turned to threaten the capital. Opposing presidents Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis, meanwhile, kept a close watch on the latest and often conflicting military intelligence gathered in the field. Throughout northern Virginia, central Maryland, and south-central Pennsylvania, meanwhile, civilians and soldiers alike struggled with the reality of a mobile campaign and the massive logistical needs of the armies. Thousands left written accounts of the passage of the long martial columns. Mingus and Wittenberg mined hundreds of primary accounts, newspapers, and other sources to produce this powerful and gripping account. As readers will quickly learn, much of it is glossed over in other studies of the campaign, a campaign which cannot be fully understood without a firm appreciation of what the armies did on their way to the small crossroads town in Pennsylvania.

This Civil War enthusiast's sourcebook organizes the crucial details of the war in an inventive format designed to enhance the reader's knowledge base and big-picture understanding of key events and outcomes. The war's causes, political and economic issues, important personalities, campaigns and battles are examined. Nearly 200 reader challenges stimulate review of critical moments, with suggested reading for further exploration. Photographs and maps have been carefully selected to supplement the topic being explored.

Unlike Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and Gen. William T. Sherman, whose controversial Civil War-era reputations persist today, Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan has been largely untouched by controversy. In "Little Phil," historian Eric J. Wittenberg reassesses the war record of a man long considered one of the Union Army's greatest generals.From his earliest days at West Point, Phil Sheridan refused to play by the rules. He was fortunate to receive merely a suspension, rather than expulsion, when as a cadet he charged a superior officer with a bayonet. Although he achieved fame as a cavalryman late in the Civil War, Sheridan actually began the conflict as an infantry commander and initially knew little of the mounted service. In his first effort as a cavalry commander with the Army of the Potomac in the spring of 1864, he gave a performance that Wittenberg argues has long been overrated. Later that year in the Shenandoah Valley, where Sheridan secured his legendary reputation, he benefited greatly from the tactical ability of his subordinates and from his huge manpower advantage against the beleaguered Confederate troops of Lt. Gen. Jubal Early.Sheridan was ultimately rewarded for numerous acts of insubordination against his superiors throughout the war, while he punished similar traits in his own officers. Further, in his combat reports and postwar writings, he often manipulated facts to show himself in the best possible light, ensuring an exalted place in history. Thus, Sheridan successfully foisted his own version of history on the American public. This controversial new study challenges the existing literature on Phil Sheridan and adds valuable insight to our understanding of this famous, butaltogether fallible, warrior.

"West Virginia was the child of the storm," concluded early Mountaineer historian and Civil War veteran, Maj. Theodore F. Lang. The northwestern third of the Commonwealth of Virginia finally broke away in 1863 to form the Union's 35th state. In Seceding from Secession: The Civil War, Politics, and the Creation of West Virginia, authors Eric J. Wittenberg, Edmund A. Sargus, and Penny L. Barrick chronicle those events in an unprecedented study of the social, legal, military, and political factors that converged to bring about the birth of the West Virginia. President Abraham Lincoln, an astute lawyer in his own right, played a critical role in birthing the new state. The constitutionality of the mechanism by which the new state would be created concerned the president, and he polled every member of his entire cabinet before signing the bill. Seceding from Secession includes a detailed discussion of the 1871 U.S. Supreme Court decision Virginia v. West Virginia, in which former Lincoln cabinet member Salmon Chase presided as chief justice over the court that decided the constitutionality of the momentous event. Seceding from Secession is grounded in a wide variety of sources and persuasively presented. Add in a brilliant Foreword by Frank J. Williams, former Chief Justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court and Chairman Emeritus of the Lincoln Forum, and it is an indispensable source for everyone interested in understanding the convergence of military, political, social, and legal events that brought about the birth of the state of West Virginia.

Avery fought in the legendary Michigan Cavalry Brigade, commanded by George Armstrong Custer * Avery's battles included Gettysburg, The Wilderness, Yellow Tavern, Haws Shop, Tom's Brook, Cedar Creek, and Trevilian Station George Armstrong Custer's fabled Fifth Regiment fought with great distinction throughout the war and suffered the third highest total of men killed in the entire Union cavalry. A twenty-four-year-old farmer and new father from Hopkins, Michigan, named James Henry Avery was one of Custer's feared Wolverines. Besides eloquently describing his personal experiences, Sergeant Avery's wartime journals and postwar reminiscences provide uniquely detailed descriptions of Civil War cavalry movements and the only known account that addresses the escape of elements of the Fifth Michigan Cavalry on the first day of the Battle of Trevilian Station.

After the ferocious fighting at Cold Harbor, Virginia, in June 1864, Union Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant ordered his cavalry, commanded by Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, to distract the Confederate forces opposing the Army of the Potomac. Glory Enough for All chronicles the battle that resulted when Confederate cavalry pursued and caught their Federal foes at Trevilian Station, Virginia, perhaps the only truly decisive cavalry battle of the American Civil War. Eric J. Wittenberg tells the stories of the men who fought there, including eight Medal of Honor winners and one Confederate whose death at Trevilian Station made him the third of three brothers to die in the service of Company A of the Fourth Virginia Cavalry. He also addresses the little-known but critical cavalry battle at Samaria (Saint Mary's) Church on June 24, 1864, where Union Brig. Gen. David N. Gregg's division was nearly destroyed. The only modern strategic analysis of the battle, Glory Enough for All challenges prevailing interpretations of General Sheridan and of the Union cavalry. Wittenberg shows that the outcome of Trevilian Station ultimately prolonged Grant's efforts to end the Civil War. Eric J.Wittenberg is the author of Gettysburg's Forgotten Cavalry Actions and the coauthor of Plenty of Blame to Go Around, among numerous books. Gordon C. Rhea is the author of several books on the Civil War, including To the North Anna River: Grant and Lee, May 13-25, 1864 and The Battle of the Wilderness, May 5-6, 1864.

Unlike Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and Gen. William T. Sherman, whose controversial Civil War-era reputations persist today, Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan has been largely untouched by controversy. In "Little Phil," historian Eric J. Wittenberg reassesses the war record of a man long considered one of the Union Army s greatest generals.From his earliest days at West Point, Phil Sheridan refused to play by the rules. He was fortunate to receive merely a suspension, rather than expulsion, when as a cadet he charged a superior officer with a bayonet. Although he achieved fame as a cavalryman late in the Civil War, Sheridan actually began the conflict as an infantry commander and initially knew little of the mounted service. In his first effort as a cavalry commander with the Army of the Potomac in the spring of 1864, he gave a performance that Wittenberg argues has long been overrated. Later that year in the Shenandoah Valley, where Sheridan secured his legendary reputation, he benefited greatly from the tactical ability of his subordinates and from his huge manpower advantage against the beleaguered Confederate troops of Lt. Gen. Jubal Early.Sheridan was ultimately rewarded for numerous acts of insubordination against his superiors throughout the war, while he punished similar traits in his own officers. Further, in his combat reports and postwar writings, he often manipulated facts to show himself in the best possible light, ensuring an exalted place in history. Thus, Sheridan successfully foisted his own version of history on the American public. This controversial new study challenges the existing literature on Phil Sheridan and adds valuable insight to our understanding of this famous, but altogether fallible, warrior.

There are countless volumes celebrating the best teams in professional baseball. Unfortunately, winning represents only one side of the game. For every champion's record-setting season, there has been an equally memorable story of defeat. These teams and their shameful contributions to America's national pastime have been a neglected topic in baseball history. Until now. In You Stink! , two fanatical historians (or historian fans), Michael Aubrecht and Eric Wittenberg, give credit where it is far overdue with a statistically backed, satiric look at the worst teams and individuals ever to set foot on a diamond. You Stink! includes franchise origins, detailed stats, player profiles, photos, and more, as well as a collection of long-format essays in a ""Hall of Shame"" that recognizes some of the worst moments ever witnessed on a ball field. The first half of the book is based entirely on statistical data; in the second half, the authors give their personal opinions. With an insightful foreword by Dave Raymond, the original ""Philly Phanatic,"" You Stink! showcases disappointments on the diamond dating as far back as 1889. Readers are treated to stories of the worst teams, players, owners, calls, fans, plays, and more. A timeline of Major League terribleness and an assortment of quotations about losing complement this unique survey of shame. Ultimately, You Stink! celebrates a sport that gives us more than just wins and losses and drives to the heart of what all of us love about baseball. Fans bond with their teams, and everyone can relate to suffering through slumps. Watching our heroes stumble through ineptitude, boneheaded plays, and heartbreaking losses makes the celebration all the sweeter when victory finally comes.

June 1863, and the Gettysburg Campaign is in its opening hours. Harnesses jingled and hooves pounded as Confederate cavalryman James Ewell Brown Stuart leads his three brigades of troopers on a ride that triggers one of the Civil War's most bitter controversies. Instead of finding glory and victory, Stuart reaped stinging criticism and substantial blame for one of the Confederacy's most stunning and unexpected battlefield defeats. Stuart left Virginia acting on Gen. Robert E. Lee's discretionary orders to advance into Maryland and Pennsylvania, where he was to screen Lt. Gen. Richard Ewell's marching infantry corps and report on enemy activity. The mission jumped off its tracks from virtually the moment it began when one unexpected event after another unfolded across Stuart's path. For days, neither Lee nor Stuart had any idea where the other was, and the enemy blocked the horseman's direct route back to the Confederate army, which was advancing nearly blind north into Pennsylvania. By the time Stuart reached Lee on July 2, the armies had unexpectedly collided at Gettysburg and one of the campaign's greatest controversies was born. Did the plumed cavalier disobey Lee's orders by stripping the army of its"eyes and ears?" Was Stuart to blame for the unexpected combat that broke out at Gettysburg on July 1? Authors Wittenberg and Petruzzi, widely recognised for their study and expertise of Civil War cavalry operations, have drawn upon a massive array of primary sources, many heretofore untapped, to fully explore Stuart's ride, its consequences, and the intense debate among participants shortly after the battle, early post-war commentators, and modern scholars.

During the Civil War, James Harvey Kidd fought along side the General George Armstrong Custer as a member of the 6th Michigan Cavalry, the Wolverines. A student at the University of Michigan at the outbreak of the ear, Kidd enlisted in 1862 and was elected captain, commanding a company of Wolverines. Within two years he was promoted to colonel and took command of the regiment. In the fall of 1864, he succeeded Custer as commander of the Michigan Cavalry Brigade and eventually received a brevet to brigadier general of volunteers. After the war, Kidd served as brigadier general in the Michigan National Guard and, upon returning to his civilian career as a newspaperman, published two newspapers in his hometown of Ionia, Michigan. He also wrote a memoir of his service Personal Reminiscences of a Cavalryman in Custer's Michigan Brigade, a classic of Civil War literature. Eric J. Wittenberg presents many of this newspaperman?s captivating writings in their original form in At Custer's Side: The Civil War Writings of James Harvey Kidd, Kidd wrote eloquently about his Civil War experiences, especially his service with Customer. His speech given at the dedication of the Customer monument in Monroe, Michigan, is particularly important, as it provides readers with one of the first revisionist views of the tragedy that befell Custer at Little Big Horn. Much like Wittenberg's first book of Kidd's writings, One of Custer's Wolverines: The Civil War Letters of Brevet Brigadier General James H. Kidd, 6th Michigan Cavalry (Kent State University Press, 2000), this latest collection offers insightful, articulate, and entertaining commentary on what it ws like to serve in the Civil War and with "the boy general".

July 1863 was a momentous month in the Civil War. News of Gettysburg and Vicksburg electrified the North and devastated the South. Sandwiched geographically between those victories and lost in the heady tumult of events was news that William S. Rosecrans's Army of the Cumberland had driven Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee entirely out of Middle Tennessee. The brilliant campaign nearly cleared the state of Rebels and changed the calculus of the Civil War in the Western Theater. Despite its decisive significance, few readers even today know of these events. The publication of Tullahoma: The Forgotten Campaign that Changed the Course of Civil War, June 23 - July 4, 1863 by award-winning authors David A. Powell and Eric J. Wittenberg, forever rectifies that oversight. On June 23, 1863, Rosecrans, with some 60,000 men, initiated a classic campaign of maneuver against Bragg's 40,000. Confronted with rugged terrain and a heavily entrenched foe, Rosecrans intended to defeat Bragg through strategy rather than bloodshed by outflanking him and seizing control of Bragg's supply line, the Nashville& Chattanooga Railroad, at Tullahoma and thus force him to fight a battle outside of his extensive earthworks. It almost worked. The complex and fascinating campaign included deceit, hard marching, fighting, and incredible luck - both good and bad. Rosecrans executed a pair of feints against Guy's Gap and Liberty Gap to deceive the Rebels into thinking the main blow would fall somewhere other than where it was designed to strike. An ineffective Confederate response exposed one of Bragg's flanks - and his entire army - to complete disaster. Torrential rains and consequential decisions in the field wreaked havoc on the best-laid plans. Still Bragg hesitated, teetering on the brink of losing the second most important field army in the Confederacy. The hour was late and time was short, and his limited withdrawal left the armies poised for a climactic engagement that may have decided the fate of Middle Tennessee, and perhaps the war. Finally fully alert to the mortal threat facing him, Bragg pulled back from the iron jaws of defeat about to engulf him and retreated - this time all the way to Chattanooga, the gateway to the rest of the Southern Confederacy. Powell and Wittenberg mined hundreds of archival and firsthand accounts to craft a splendid study of this overlooked campaign that set the stage for the Battles of Chickamauga and Chattanooga, the removal of Rosecrans and Bragg from the chessboard of war, the elevation of U.S. Grant to command all Union armies, and the early stages of William T. Sherman's Atlanta Campaign. Tullahoma - one of the most brilliantly executed major campaigns of the war-was pivotal to Union success in 1863 and beyond. And now readers everywhere will know precisely why.